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BOOK R E V I E W  
Wall Street: Security Risk. HURD BARUCH. Washington: Acropolis 
Books Ltd. 1971. Pp. iv. 356. SS.95. 
Fashions in books follow fashions in life. And a fashion with the 
perennial endurance of the quest for wealth brings each year a fertile 
harvest to swell the bookseller's inventory. 
Books about the stock market. appearing and receding in dull 
succession. rank high among popular non-fiction works in terms of 
the number of titles published. These books, which usually combine 
basic information with more or less "helpful'" hints and investment 
techniques. seem to sell when taken as a group. But seldom does a 
factual book about America's second-most sought after value achieve 
or deserve distinction. 
The Ilfoney Ganre by "Adam Smith" (later revealed to be 
George J. W. Goodman) combined the dual virtues of expos6 and 
alluring subject matter to propel itself to best-seller success. The in- 
sightful and somewhat discomfiting revelations of IVall SI~L-L~Z:  Stw- 
rity Risk perhaps aim to provide similarly potent promotional stuff. 
The two books are. however. quite different in their approach. The 
author of The hiorley Gartre \\?as, despite his candor and consequent 
attempt at anonymity. a securities industry insider. His presentation 
of the foibles and human frailties of the brokerage community 
permeated with a boys-\\rill-be-boys attitude of sympathetic under- 
standing. Not so with Hurd Baruch. whose authorship of lt"t711Srru.t.f: 
Security Risk evidences the predictable ritualized quasi-hostility of a 
professional regulator. His years on the staff of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (where he has risen to the level of Special 
Counsel in the Division of Trading and Markets) have obviously left 
Mr. Baruch with not only an intimate knowledge of the securities 
industry but with a somewhat special perspective as v;ell. 
It is this perspective that brings life to what amounts to a 3Q8- 
plus page essay on the capitalization practices of brokerage firms and 
the dry complex of laws. rules and regulations pertaining thereto. 
With a sort of subtle drama. and an eye to the comprehension prob- 
lems of the non-lawyer reader. Mr. Baruch builds an unsettling and 
at times astonishing picture of the inefficient and anti-competitive 
house that American capitalism built. 
That house is of course the New York Stock Exchange. the 
Exchange itself and the relatively limited number of influential firms 
which together control its policy and furnish its personality. Unfor- 
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tunate though it may be that the dominant factor i n  the securities 
business is a monopolistic cartel. the situation becomes preposterous 
when. as a matter of federal policy. the cartel is expected to regulate 
itself in the public interest. Such. at least. is the conclusion of Mr. 
Baruch. 
An impressive. sometimes ponderous. array of evidence is pro- 
duced in support of the conclusion that self-regulation has amounted 
to no-regulation, except to the extent that regulation serves the pur- 
poses of the securities industry giants. Such a conclusion is not espe- 
cially surprising; what is more surprising is that anyone ever really 
believed that self-regulation could work in the first place. To perceive 
why self-regulation was made a key component of federal securities 
policy and to appreciate the specific short-comings of self-regulation. 
an understanding must first be had of the conditions in the securities 
business which give rise to a need for any special regulation at all. 
Brokerage houses are custodians of huge amounts of their custo- 
mers' property. Cash customers leave freely withdrawable money and 
securities with their brokers. for greater or lesser periods of time. 
largely for convenience. Customers who receive credit from brokerage 
houses also leave money and securities on deposit. though credit cus- 
tomers are not free to withdraw until repayment of credits extended. 
The brokerage firms neither pay nor. in the case of cash customers. 
render any special services for the use of this property. Nor are the 
firms subject to extensive regulation (as are, for example. insurance 
companies and banks) tending to assure safe use of their customers' 
property. 
To be sure. however. customers' cash and securities are used by 
their brokers. In  fact. such property constitutes a major component 
in  the financial structure of New York Stock Exchange member 
firms. Experience has shown that withdrawals by customers are ordi- 
narily offset by other customers' deposits. There is thus no reason for 
securities firms to keep sufficient cash and securities on hand to meet 
all obligations to all of their customers. Indeed, it would be wasteful 
for a firm to do so when the bulk of such funds could be at work in  
the firm's business-making money for its owners. 
Customers' securities. left with the firm, provide an even more 
important source of financing than does customers' cash. Most com- 
monly. brokers turn customers' securities into cash by pledging them 
as collateral for bank loans. This method, despite its simplicity and 
utility. has the disadvantage of being relatively inefficient: banks do 
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not like to lend more than 75 per cent of the market value of the 
securities pledged. By lending customers' securities to another broker 
(on which a 100 per cent deposit is required). or by delivering them 
in settlement of sales by customers (or sales by the firm itself). the 
entire market value of the customers' securities can be converted to 
cash. 
The securities industry justifies this cashing in on the ground that 
it is necessary in order to finance custonlers' margin (i.t9. credit) 
transactions. This justification is only partial at best. So t  only is cash 
realized far in excess of margin financing needs. but as an everyday 
occurrence customers' fully paid for securities son~ehov; seem to get 
accidently (and unlawfully) pledged. I f  and when disaster strikes. 
these fully paid customer-owned securities can be redeemed by their 
owners-but only by paying for them again. 
All of which might be highly academic if the securities industry 
(or even the giants of the securities industry) were built upon the solid 
rocks of hard capital which the public is led to believe underlie lipall 
Street.' Unfortunately. however. disasters do strike. as in 1969 and 
1970 when over one hundred New York Stock Exchange member 
firms became basket cases ripe for the receivers. Losses to customers 
of these firms have so far been measured only in terms of inconveni- 
ence. frozen accounts and unrequested transfers of accounts from 
broker to broker. But this comparatively happy fact derives more 
from the enlightened benevolence of the New York Stock Exchange 
than from any built-in protection to which customers \yere entitled as 
such. For when a brokerage firm fails. all who have supplied it with 
financing. including its customers, stand to lose.? Moreover. when 
hard times are coming. the suppliers of a firm's equity financing. v;ho 
are normally the first to know. seem to find \~:ays to get their money 
out while the getting is still possible. 
To protect the customers stranded by this \vave CIS insolvent 
firms. the New York Stock Exchange came to the rescue pitching in 
hlr. Baruch's implications notwithstanding, no question of basic propriety is  ra i rd  bq 
the broker's use of customer-owned property. The securities industry must compete oith alter- 
native economic investments for capital resources by impljing a cornpatitire n t e  of rcturn. Tt;. 
availability for use in the firm's business of property in customers' accounts i s  a factor nficsting 
that rate of return. Specific charges for services are another factor. Assum~ng that it is  c q  to 
enter the securities business (Mr. Baruch notes that a brokcnge firm requires 161) capital than 
a franchise hamburger stand). one must conclude that it ~vorlts out in the long run so that ths 
securities business is not immorally profitable at  the customer's expense once risk and ~t t : r  
relevant factors have been taken into considention. The customer bcnefits thraugh lor$tr 
charges for specific services. 
Of course in highly prosperous times only the ewers stand directly to gain. 
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not only the entirety of its "Special Trust ~ u n d "  but throwing in its 
savings for a new building as well. Even this magnanimous gesture 
was inadequate. however. and talk of "technicalities" gained cur- 
rency as the Exchange looked for ways to avoid responsibilities to the 
customers of destitutes among its least powerful  member^.^ Mr. Bar- 
uch implies that only congressional intervention caused a change of 
heart on the part of the Exchange which ultimately came to the aid 
of the customers in question-as a price for passage of the Securities 
Investor Protection Act of 1970. 
Interestingly. the securities industry initially opposed the enact- 
ment of legislation to provide for insurance of brokerage accounts 
similar to that offered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
for bank depositers. Perhaps it was fear of accompanying reforms 
which prompted opposition to such patently beneficial legislation. I n  
any event, industry pressures left their mark on the final Securities 
Investor Protection Act: insurance of customers' accounts is limited 
to at most $50.000 whereas obligations of bankrupt firms to otlter 
brokers may be covered 100 per cent. Intense industry interest in  
dominating the Securities Investor Protection Corporation resulted i n  
an ambiguous compromise which offers no assurance of public con- 
trol over the disbursement of taxpayers' money. 
Despite the securities industry's opposition to any substitution of 
outside regulation in place of self-regulation. the inherent weakness 
of self-regulation became incontrovertably apparent during the 1969- 
70 debacle of failures. The pressures on brokers' "back-office" cleri- 
cal personnel created by the upsurge in  trading volume in the late 
sixties resulted in  the much talked about "breakdown" which played 
a large part in a number of brokerage house failures. The value of 
securities undelivered by their settlement dates grew to billions of 
dollars. One prestigious house had lost track of $700 million of securi- 
ties and still attempted to do business as usual. That this firm was 
able to do so is cited by Mr. Baruch as evidence of how the securities 
industry "abdicated its self-regulatory responsibilities." 
In  these difficult circumstances, self-regulation proved to be a 
system of imposing only token or ineffective sanctions and controls 
on violators; the Exchange seemed to be powerless to do much more 
against influential industry members. Indeed, during the speculative 
rush of the late 1960's. when accounts and new offices were opened 
a Strictly speaking, ex-members. 
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with abandon in the face of mounting paperwork difficulties. the 
Exchange took no effective action. despite prompting and prodding 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Perhaps the special pressures generated out of trjing times may 
explain (but never justify) the failure of self-regulation to adhere 
strictly to existing standards. But what can be said \$hen the self- 
regulator's prescriptions of rules. adopted for all time and uninflu- 
enced by the standard-bending passions of the worst of financial bad 
times. are in reality mere illusions of regulation? 
As a striking example of such non-regulatory rules. Mr. Baruch 
cites the so-called "net capital rule" which has been used by the Sell, 
York Stock Exchange in order to exempt its members from the more 
stringent and far less loop-hole ridden net capital rule of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. Both the Commission\ net capital rule 
and that of the Exchange are supposed to protect investors by requir- 
ing. as a condition of doing business. that the brokerage firm ov;ners' 
investment, excluding illiquid assets. bear a fixed ratio (26:Ij to the 
firm's aggregate indebtedness. Nonetheless. differences in the details 
of the two rules permit a considerable "protection gap." For exam- 
ple. under the Exchange's net capital rule. owners of firms can pull 
money out while the firm already has too little capital to comply with 
the net capital rule. The observance of the Exchange's rule has 
matched the laxity of the rule itself. At least one firm was counting 
among its liquid assets the anticipated tax refunds to be paid at year- 
end in respect of losses sustained to date. 
The sum of the New York Stock Exchange's regulatory record 
during the collapses of 1969-70 was not very good. Mr. Baruch would 
have us conclude. The Exchange either did not have the pov.er (or 
competance) or the will to set effective standards. discover violations 
of those standards and punish the violators. 
One might inquire as to the whereabouts of the Exchange Corn- 
mission a t  such a crucial time. If the troubles were so virulent, viola- 
tions so rampant and dangerous, and the public interest so jeopar- 
dized, why was the SEC content to stay for the m ~ s t  part behind the 
scenes ineffectivually pushing on strings? Mr. Baruch admits that the 
Commission was aware of the problems and mindful of some possible 
solutions. Moreover, the Commission was not legally po\l:erless, at 
least where firms having severe business difficulties might, at very 
least, be guilty of fraud in the sale of securities. 
Mr. Baruch's explanations for SEC inaction tend to be ~ e a k  and 
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suggest that /lobody knew precisely how to make the best out of a very 
bad time for the securities business. Other than attempting to "run 
with" firms having difficulties (as the New York Stock Exchange 
apparently did). about the only alternative would have been to close 
them down. Whether this solution to the difficulties of 1969-1970 
would have been preferable-or better for the customers of the firms 
concerned-is highly questionable. Can the New York Stock Ex- 
change's way of doing things be so bad when. after all is said and 
done. the Exchange picks up the tab where it has not quite succeeded? 
Focusing on its results rather than on its procedures. the New 
York Stock Exchange has done a pretty fair job of protecting inves- 
tors from monetary loss. especially considering that it is a "private 
club controlled by a small clique of firms." Parallels to the Ex- 
change's record of willingness to sacrifice cash are hard to find in  the 
business world. This is not. however. to say that a few adjustments 
adjustmentsmight not be helpful. Mr. Baruch feels that specific action 
is needed in  the related areas of customer protection. "back office" 
operational systems. price competition in brokerage services. and in-  
creased govern mental oversight. 
Customer protection reforms would include a requirement of 
more effective segregation from the broker's own property of custo- 
mers' property entrusted to the broker. Deep inside. Mr. Baruch 
seems disposed to accomplish this segregation by legally requiring 
separation of the "broker" (agent's) function of securities firms from 
their "dealer" (principal's) functions. Sensing that such a radical 
proposal will not be immediately embraced. alternative (and some- 
what less drastic) surgery is also proposed. analogizing to commodi- 
ties market practices and suggesting stiff requirements for escrowed 
reserves. A realistic net capital rule and improved record-keeping and 
monitoring procedures are also components in Mr. Baruch's custo- 
mer protection plan. 
While implementing the segregation proposals will deprive secur- 
ities firms of a significant source of financing. Mr. Baruch seems 
convinced that the industry as a whole will not be put underwater as 
a consequence. Difficulties may result for shaky firms. but these are 
precisely the firms which. under present regulations. cause the greatest 
customer protection problems. Other firms may replace the lost fi- 
nancing by publicly offering their own equity securities. thereby al- 
lowing investors to share in not only the risks but also the profits of 
capitalizing the securities industry. 
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As the panacea for "back-office" operational problems. Mr. 
Baruch advocates a certificateless society in which the stock certifi- 
cate would be replaced by computer memories and non-negotiable 
"confirmations of ownership." This. together with price competition 
on brokerage commissions. would lead to an industry-\vide shake- 
down through which (according to Mr. Baruch] only a small number 
of powerful oligopolists would survive. And such a result. supposedly. 
would be optimal from the investor's point of vie\v. 
On the question of increased governmental oversight. Mr. Bnr- 
uch notes (a) the inevitable inability of self-regulation to assure inves- 
tor protection and (b) the fine record of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. together with the fact the Commission needs more 
money and independence. Unwilling to call for the outright abandon- 
ment of self-regulation. he calls instead for "coordinate regulation" 
with the government supreme. leaving only a supplementary role to 
the self-regulators. Making the Commission the czar of the industry 
would no doubt result in more efficient regulation than the present 
anarchy of give and take. Whether it would result in "better" regula- 
tion is another question. 
John .+I. Hlinlbach* 
* Assistant Professor of Law. Brooklyn Law School; B.A.. Miami Llnivcrsity. 1963; J.D. 
summa cum laude, Ohio State University. 1966. 
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